Lake Pedder Committee of Enquiry Interim Report

The Future of Lake Pedder Annexure

Reasons of Mr Edward St John, O.C.

Table of Contents

Foreword

This is not a dissenting report. On the contrary, I fully agree with everything said in the joint Interim Report, which I have signed and which I assisted in drafting. Nor is this a minority report, if that phrase is used to convey any idea of disagreement with a majority Reporter its conclusions. It is rather a separate and supplementary statement of the writer's reasons for the conclusions at which we, as a Committee, have arrived, as they are expressed in our joint Interim Report.

Not everyone thinks in the same way, nor would wish to express himself in terms identical with those chosen by others. My colleagues on the Committee possess professional qualifications in engineering and scientific areas where I am lacking. I have different qualifications and a different range of experience. Each of us is able to contribute, therefore, from our differing experience and viewpoints.

Committee reports have usually been joint documents, both as to the conclusions and the reasons for them, but it is quite customary, by comparison, for judges sitting together on a case to state their separate reasons. This latter practice, though it has some drawbacks, has advantages too, which lawyers will acknowledge.

Until I was appointed to this Committee of Enquiry I knew little of Lake Pedder. But having heard and seen the evidence, (for this included photographs and coloured slides as well as written and oral evidence), I personally feel very strongly that the Lake can and must be saved. And feeling this strongly, as I do, I wish to express it as cogently as I am able to do, in the hope that I may thereby contribute to the saving of this great national possession, now submerged beneath the waters of the new impoundment.

Last, I should say that whilst avoiding, I should hope, any tedious repetition of what appears already in our joint Interim Report. I have decided that for ease of reading I should make my separate statement complete and sufficient in itself, so far as possible, to convey the reasons, as I see them, why Lake Pedder must be saved. Consistently with that endeavour I shall merely summarise, without repeating, some of the material, particularly on the cost and engineering aspects, which appears in the joint Interim Report.

1. Summary of Conclusions

The Lake (Lake Pedder) and surrounding area is of immense aesthetic value and the intractable nature of the terrain and vegetation makes it a challenging wilderness. Until recent years the whole south western quarter of Tasmania was uninhabited and mostly unvisited by man. It is therefore a unique wilderness of incomparable significance and value. Its impending destruction to provide power Production for about half a century must be regarded as the greatest ecological tragedy since European settlement of Tasmania.

Statement from "Project Aqua" UNESCO International Biological Programme

In this Interim Report the Committee has dealt solely with the immediate questions relating to the future of Lake Pedder. having regard to the fact that the Lake is now covered by some 30 feet of water, as a result of the filling of the Serpentine and Huon impoundments. According to the evidence given before us, the Lake and its environs will probably re cover from this immersion, which has already occurred over a period of some nine months, provided the area is drained, by releasing the dammed waters, by the summer of this year, 1973. Having regard to the fact that the views expressed by the Committee on this matter will need to be considered, first, by the Australian Government, and then, depending on action taken by that Government, probably by the Tasmanian Government also, and the length of time involved in bringing the waters down to an appropriate level, it became obvious that the Committee must report quickly if its expression of opinion was to be of any value in the endeavour to save the Lake. Hence the delivery of the Interim Report at this stage.

The views expressed by the Committee in our Joint Interim Report are of course addressed primarily to the Australian Government. The Committee has no power to make any recommendations to the Government of the State of Tasmania; nor does it presume to do so.

The complete Terms of Reference for our Enquiry are set out as an Appendix to our joint Report. It suffices for present purposes to repeat the words of the second Term of Reference (pursuant to which we have made this Interim Report), which read as follows:

"2 To suggest what action, if any, might be taken to alleviate, or compensate for, any adverse consequence which may be considered to have arisen from the flooding of Lake Pedder."

The Conclusions of the Committee under this term of reference, as they are set forth in our joint Interim Report, are as follows:

"The final judgement concerning the fate of Lake Pedder must be made at the political /eve/, hat is by those whom Australians have elected to decide on national and State priorities and needs. Our role is to assist this judgement by providing an assessment of the facts and opinions on the matter, so far as we can ascertain them.

It is also our role, having considered the submissions presented to us, to express the opinions and views we have formed. In general, these have been given in the body of this Report. In summary they are:

1. The decision-making process which led to the flooding of Lake Pedder had weaknesses.

2. The evidence concerning the recovery of the lake indicates that it is highly likely that the lake would recover acceptably if restored to its normal level during 1973.

3. The Lake Pedder National Park was proclaimed a scenic reserve in 1955 in the normal way, the boundaries were developed to take account of the views of the Hydro-Electricity Commission concerning likely developments; there was public expectation that the dedication of the reserve was permanent

4. The wilderness area of South West Tasmania, Of which Lake Pedder was the focal point, is outstanding, and is a national asset

5. Lake Pedder was of significant international scientific interest and importance.

6. Lake Pedder was a place of outstanding beauty.

7. There has been a significant change in public and political attitudes to environmental issues since the decision to flood Lake Pedder Was made by the Par/lament of Tasmania in 1967.

8. There are practicable modifications to the present scheme which do nor involve flooding Lake Pedder.

9. The case for retaining the present scheme unchanged rests basically on the cost of such modification.

10. The estimated costs of the modification which appears most acceptable would be of the order of $12 million in capital expenditures and a LOSS Of $1 1 million representing the capitalised value of energy forgone from the Huon waters. If after a moratorium such modification were decided upon, these costs would be incurred from 1976 onwards.

11. The adoption of a five year moratorium period during which Lake Pedder would be at least temporarily restored by partly draining the Serpentine/Huon impoundment would be unlikely to prejudice the ability of the HEC to meet expected power demands. Even three years would probably be an adequate length for a moratorium.

Adoption of a moratorium may involve additional running of he Bell Bay thermal station. We estimate the total cost of this extra running at a maximum of $8 million over he period from 1977 to about 1982.

This cost could be offset to some degree by the value of additional timber salvaged from the Gordon Valley.

12. There are precedents for Government expenditures such as these to yield benefits which are largely intangible.

13. There are national interests involved which would justify The Australian Government in meeting the costs involved in the moratorium or alternative scheme.

There are various uncertainties -the extent to which the lake would recover, and derails of alternative schemes, in particular which we believe preclude recommendation of a specific alternative at this stage. The moratorium proposal appears to provide a reasonably cheap way Of resolving the various uncertainties.

In summary, bearing in mind the substance of our second Term of Reference, this Committee expresses the opinions that:

The loss of Lake Pedder was an adverse consequence of the Gordon River Power Development Stage 7.

The moratorium proposal would alleviate that adverse consequence. The moratorium proposal should be adopted with a view to assessing the feasibility of restoring Lake Pedder.

The costs should be borne by the Australian Government."

I agree with those Conclusions, as far as they go. But for myself, I should have been prepared to go further, and to say, as I now do quite unequivocally, that in my view -

Lake Pedder can and should be saved.

My personal reasons for this conclusion, in summary, are as follows:-

1. Lake Pedder and its environs, as they existed prior to inundation, were of unique value from many points of view: aesthetic; scientific; as a tourist attraction and as a place of recreation; and as the very heart of Tasmania's South West. one of the last great wilderness areas of the world still largely unaffected by man.

2. Lake Pedder had very properly been declared a Tasmanian National Park in 1955, and as such should be preserved, as far as possible in its natural state, as an asset of national importance comparable to that of the Great Barrier Reef, Ayers Rock, Sydney Harbour and the Australian Alps.

3. It is still physically possible to save Lake Pedder by allowing the impounded waters which now cover it to fall below the normal level of the natural Lake Pedder by the summer of 1973/74.

4. If this were done, Lake Pedder would probably, in the course of a few years, be restored to something very like its natural state.

5. The inundation of Lake Pedder would have improved the economics of the Gordon Power Development, but it is not essential to it. The value of Lake Pedder, restored to its natural state, will far outweigh the cost likely to be involved in saving it.

It follows that in my view the Australian Government should give urgent consideration to the possibility of persuading the Government and Parliament of Tasmania to take the steps necessary to save the Lake, the Australian Government agreeing to meet the whole cost involved.

Alternatively, if it should not be possible to induce at this stage a final decision to save the Lake, the Australian Government should endeavour to persuade the Tasmanian Government to agree to release the impounded waters, if possible during this winter, to an agreed level, sufficient to restore the Lake, for an agreed moratorium period, following which a final decision can be made in the light of the circumstances then existing. In this event also the Australian Government should offer to meet the whole cost involved.

The evidence and considerations supporting these views appear in the following statement of reasons.

2. Brief History of Lake Pedder and the

Middle Gordon Power Scheme

On the 11th March we reached two beautiful lakes, which were named Lake Pedder and Lake Maria, lying in the heart of the most romantic scenery and being surrounded by lofty mountains

John Wedge. discoverer of Lake Pedder 1835

An attempt to enter on the full detailed history and circumstances surrounding the flooding of Lake Pedder at this stage is unnecessary for the present purpose, and could be unfair to the Hydro-Electric Commission of Tasmania,' which intends to supply us with an

historical document which will, one trusts, prove extremely valuable in the preparation of an objective and definitive history of this rather vexed matter.

The nature of the HEC contribution to our Enquiry is dealt with in the joint Interim Report, and there is no necessity to repeat it here.

Suffice it to say that despite the decision made by the HEC. after a certain stage, not to participate further in the Enquiry, the Committee was possessed of sufficient information to enable it to proceed, and this it decided to do.

For the purposes of these my reasons, therefore, I shall confine ourselves to a brief outline of the history, sufficient, I would hope, to place the matter in perspective for present purposes. In our full Report, to be issued at a later stage, the Committee will, (as required by the Terms of Reference), deal in detail with the history and circumstances surrounding the flooding of Lake Pedder, and in particular the history and circumstances surrounding the decision making processes, at the various stages, which led to the decision to flood the Lake. with a view to drawing conclusions and making recommendations on the various matters covered by the Terms of Reference.

The Lake Pedder Area

Lake Pedder is, or was, a natural lake situated in the South West of Tasmania, the island State to the south of Australia's eastern coast. Tasmania's South West has been described by Sir Edmund Hillary as "one of the last great wilderness areas of the world" And Lake Pedder, as it has been described to us, was the "heart of the South West", a natural recreational area, of incomparable beauty and great scientific value, and a jumping off point for expeditions further afield.

When I speak of Lake Pedder I use the name, as others have used it in evidence before the Committee, not to signify merely a body of water, but rather a whole environment of which the Lake was the centrepiece. It is rather important that one shouId here try to convey, however inadequately, a preliminary impression of Lake Pedder and environs as it has built up in one's mind from the evidence of many different categories of witnesses, and the photographs and slides we were fortunate enough to see during the course of our Enquiry. One sees in the mind's eye a shallow lake, some four square miles in area, with a very broad2 and beautiful beach of white quartzite sand on its eastern shore; behind this, high dunes; a series of small connected lakes, including Lake Maria. and the rivulets of Maria Creek draining into it from the east; the Serpentine, taking its source at the other end of the Lake and thence winding its way north through the button grass plains in the valley to join the mighty Gordon, adjacent hillsides and forest areas; the many evidences of glacial action in a remote past, such as the scooped out cirques, many of them containing their mountain tarns, and the detritus which has fallen into the valley, pushing the river to the northern side and lowering the gradient of the stream, thus giving it its unique meanders, anabranches and fossil anabranches, in what Mr Bruce Jones3 called "marvellous development"; the reflected light from the gleaming sands; clouds and sky, storm and sunshine, trees, bush, hills and mountains, the beautiful lights of sunrise and sunset, indigenous animals, birds and insects, many of them unique to that area -a whole beautiful and complex environment for man's wonder and delight, still as nature made it all of this perfectly mirrored, quite often, in the still, calm waters of the creeks and lakes, the whole set amongst the majesty and grandeur of the Frankland Range to the west, dignified Mount Solitary and other mountains to the east.

Such was Lake Pedder.

I shall refer, now and then, to all this, (including the upper reaches of the Serpentine), as "the Lake Pedder complex" or "Pedder", lest we lose sight of the fact that one is referring not just to a single sheet of water, (which might easily be replaced, one might think, by a larger sheet of water, without much loss), but to something far more precious, and so much more complex, detailed and various than the too brief description "Lake Pedder" might seem to imply.

The Lake Pedder complex was not just another lake, similar to others, of which Tasmania has many. From what we were told in evidence by highly sensitive and intelligent people from many walks of life, Lake Pedder (using that name in the broad sense I have described) was one of nature's great and incomparable masterpieces, distinctive and unique, as precious to Australia and the world as Ayers Rock, Sydney Harbour or the Great Barrier Reef.

I hope I may say at once therefore -gently, and without malice, but with confidence that what I say is right -that any man who allows Lake Pedder to perish, if he has the chance to help in saving it, will bear a heavy responsibility indeed.

Early Days

Lake Pedder and the South West remained practically unaffected by man, despite its occasional visitors, from the time of the first discovery of the Lake by a white man in t 835. until the flooding of Lake Pedder, as part of the Gordon River Power Development, in 1972.

Contrary to what has sometimes been alleged, one is satisfied that in more recent times, and even prior to the controversy which arose in 1967, many people, even including small children with their parents, came constantly to the Lake, many on foot, but many also by light aeroplane, for which the beach made an ideal landing strip in summer. It is therefore not true to say that Pedder was the preserve of hardy bushwalkers alone. The number of visitors increased with the building of the Gordon River Road, beginning in 1963. (see later), which brought Pedder within only six miles walking distance from the nearest road, and even more so as Lake Pedder became the subject of increasing publicity and controversy, following the adoption of the Gordon River Power Development by the Tasmanian Parliament in 1967. Nonetheless one was persuaded, by the evidence of Mr Max Angus and others, that the Lake complex remained practically unspoiled, despite these developments, up to the time of its immersion.

Establishment of Lake Pedder National Park

In 1955 Lake Pedder and some 92 square miles of surrounding lands were gazetted as a scenic reserve, under the name "Lake Pedder National Park", pursuant to the provisions of the Tasmanian Scenery Preservation Act, 1915. Many people believed that the Lake and environs were thenceforth to be inviolate.

The gazettal effected no physical change. The proclamation of the Lake Pedder National Park was, and remains, nonetheless, a very important factor in the situation which greatly strengthened the conservation case, in the events that followed. As to this, see later, (under "Lake Pedder National Park").

The Middle Gordon Power Scheme

Who hath measured the waters in the hollow of his hand, and meted our heaven with the span, and comprehended the dust of he earth in a measure, and weighed he mountains in scales, and the hills in a balance?

Isaiah 40.12

There is a breath-taking boldness about the Middle Gordon Power Scheme.

If the first Stage (officially described as the Gordon Power Development, Stage One) is completed in accordance with what is now planned the impounded waters will cover an area equivalent to almost one per cent of the whole land mass of Tasmania. To quote the HEC, it "will create Australia's largest water storage..... three times the size of Eucumbene, largest lake in he Snowy Scheme, and about 27 times the volume of water in Sydney Harbour."

Even if Lake Pedder were saved from the Scheme, it would not subtract greatly from these figures. If, for instance, the Huon impoundment were to be deleted, and the Serpentine impoundment lowered, (and a pumping system installed, as discussed later), there would be a loss of only 12%4 of the water

for power production at the Gordon Power Station. It is important to emphasise this point from the outset, as many people have had the false impression that the immersion of Lake Pedder was vitally important to the economics of the whole Scheme. This was not so, as we shall see: the flooding of Lake Pedder was thought to improve the economics of the Scheme, but the Scheme would have been viable without it.

The work on the Middle Gordon Power Scheme, which involved, almost incidentally. the flooding of Lake Pedder, was executed by the Tasmanian Hydro-Electric Commission by the authority of the Parliament of Tasmania.

Background

Some brief background notes will not be inappropriate at this stage, so that the history of the Middle Gordon Scheme may be seen in better perspective.5

Of all the Australian States Tasmania is the most richly endowed with water resources, relative to area. The history of water utilisation for the generation of electric power in Tasmania extends back to the last century. The Hydro Electric Commission was established as a statutory authority in 1930 to exercise sole right of generation, distribution and sale of electricity throughout Tasmania. It is said that "over the years the Commission has gained an enviable reputation for electrical innovation and engineering excellence ....."6

"By the late 1950's, having harnessed the more accessible resources of the Derwent, South-Esk, and Mersey-Forth river systems it was natural that the Commission should next direct attention to the high rainfall areas of the western portion of the State. The principal barriers to be overcome were lack of access facilities and he obvious cost implications of constructing and servicing major generating facilities in such rugged and uninhabited country."7

At the time of which the author of this quote (B.W. Davis) was writing, the south western quarter of Tasmania was (according to K. McKenry) "completely roadless and land access was by foot. Much of the region remains" (to this day) "unvisited, and a handful of rough walking tracks provide he major evidence of man's occasional presence. Reasons for the lack of development in the area are not hard to come by: first, the climate is severe by Australian standards.....; secondly, he terrain is a forbidding mixture of swampy button grass plains and rugged mountain ranges, with a liberal sprinkling of virtually impenetrable vegetation which is found, for the most parr, on he sides of mountains and in valleys. The major potential of the region seems to be in water power and recreation", or as Mr Davis has it (rather neatly), in the title of his paper from which we have quoted earlier, "water power and wilderness".

Prior to the outbreak of the Pedder controversy, after the announcement in 1967 of the intention to flood the Lake as part of the Middle Gordon Scheme, (and indeed, even since then), it could be said that the HEC had "had it all their own way". Both Government and Opposition parties were united in their enthusiastic support for the policy of "hydro industrialisation". Tasmania was a relatively poor state, of small population; by exploiting her water resources she would be able to supply cheap electric power; cheap power would bring industry; industry would create employment; this in turn would lead to a higher population and greater prosperity for the State; and all this the "development", the industrialisation. the increase in population and so on was undoubtedly a good thing. So the theorems, with ineluctable logic, ran, and everyone, or almost everyone, was happy to accept the axioms and their conclusions. This policy, and the HEC's efficient operation of it, had never been seriously questioned. And so it was, no doubt, that the HEC may have felt it could proceed with its schemes for the South West with confidence, sure of support -even, (so it may well have imagined) to the extent (if it should come to that) of flooding Lake Pedder and a major part of the National Park of which it was the centrepiece. in the process of building a bigger and better impoundment. So it may well have felt; but already in doing so it was sowing the seeds for the bitter dispute which first erupted fully in 1967 and continues to this day.

The questioning occasioned by Pedder now extends beyond that immediate issue.

There are many now to question the whole philosophy upon which the "hydro-power syndrome" was based. May not Tasmania be a better and happier place, some would say, very much as it is? Are greater industrialisation and a higher population necessarily such a boon? May it not be a better policy for Tasmania to foster its tourist industry, or small-scale, labour intensive industry than the large scale, capital intensive developments which thrive on cheap electric power? Is cheap electric power really as important to industry anyhow, when other factors, such as Tasmania's distance from markets, and lack of raw materials, are taken into account? May not hydro-power be superseded, or lose its cost advantage, with the advent of nuclear-power stations, the development of natural gas resources. possible solar power and so on? These are some of the questions.

One is not so foolish as to attempt an answer here, nor is it to be assumed that one would side with the critics if one were to do so. But a questioning and a doubting there certainly is, such as the State has never experienced before. That in itself may not be a bad thing. whatever the final outcome of the debate may be.

What is of more immediate importance to our Enquiry, however, are the questions which have sprung from a growing concern for the environment, and for values which transcend the mere making or saving of money. This occurrence is not of course peculiar to Tasmania, nor Australia generally. It was perhaps unfortunate for the HEC and the Government of Tasmania that the decision to flood Lake Pedder should have coincided with the development of this growing concern for the environment in Australia. The decision to flood Pedder was important and sure to be productive of some controversy anyhow; of this, the HEC, despite its previous immunity from criticism, must surely have been aware. But the conjunction of these events transformed Pedder into a symbol, a rallying call and a battlecry for conservationists throughout Australia and beyond. It is true enough, perhaps, as the HEC claims, than many who took up the cry were ignorant of Pedder, and perhaps "didn't even know how to spell it"; the fact remains that in Pedder they had an issue of genuinely classic proportions, not to be lightly huffed and puffed and blown away, even if some of the more remote protagonists were perhaps more in love with conservation than in love with Pedder.

History

Not very much of this appears to have been foreseen by the HEC, or anyone else, when first the Commission engineers began to think seriously about the rivers of the South West in the 1950's, or even as they proceeded to develop their plans in the 1960's.

Of these rivers of the South West the greatest is the Gordon, which flows to the west coast. Into the Gordon flows the Serpentine, taking its source from the western shore of Pedder. Some few miles to the east of Lake Pedder is Mount Solitary, and the watershed between west and east, from which the Huon begins its long journey to the east coast, south of Hobart. It is not, perhaps, surprising in the circumstances that the HEC, given its orientation, should have turned its attention first to the Gordon, and that its interest shouId have extended, as it did, in due course, also, to the Serpentine and the Huon.

Action began in a small way, with the installation of automatic flow recorders on the Gordon in 1953, but, paradoxically, work began in real earnest in 1955, the very year of the dedication of Lake Pedder as a National Park. about which time Mr Knight, (as he then was) informed the Scenery Preservation Board, of which he was a member, that "the Commission might build a dam near the junction of the Gordon and Serpentine Rivers (which) would probably flood a good part of the valley of the Serpentine, which war chiefly button grass...." (My emphasis. See later, under the heading "Lake Pedder National Park")

According to McKenry (who had access to HEC records and engineers in preparing his paper), "during 1962 a number of possible scheme layouts were formulated in the design office of the HEC and preliminary cost estimates were made." During the course of these investigations, "it became evident that some diversion of the water from the Upper Huon would be economic."9

Various possibilities were considered, some involving the flooding of Lake Pedder, but McKenry says,10 and the HEC has confirmed 11 that attempts were made at that time to find some other arrangement whereby the flooding of Lake Pedder couId be avoided. Me Kenry says 12 that "A number of alternatives were considered in which the level of the Serpentine storage was dropped to below that of Lake Pedder, hereby preserving the integrity of the existing Lake." All, however, were more costly than the proposal which found ultimate favour, namely: to dam the Gordon; to dam the Serpentine; to dam the Huon; to allow the waters of the Serpentine and the Huon to rise until they merged across the saddle which lay between the catchments. flooding Lake Pedder in the process; to allow the waters of the Serpentine and the Huon to flow through a canal at McPartlan Pass into the Lake created by the damming of the Gordon, and to construct a power station below the Gordon Dam which would draw its power from the waters of all three rivers : the Gordon: the Serpentine (now at the time of writing already hidden from view for the whole of its length, from its source to a point just above its confluence with the Gordon), and the Huon, above Scott's Peak dam. 13

"Although no formal decisions were made at this early stage" (1962), Me Kenry14 says that "it is clear that the HEC did not consider the preservation of Lake Pedder warranted the costs involved in deviating from (this) most favoured arrangement" (My emphasis).

McKenry's inference, if such it was, appears to be confirmed by the terms of the submission made to the Australian Government in 1963 in support of an application for a sum of &2,500.000 to build a road to the Gordon River. Davis points out15 that the HEC submission contains the statement: "The proposed location of this road is shown on the maps, its somewhat circuitous route being necessary to avoid areas which will subsequently be flooded by the Middle Gordon storages" (My emphasis).

This submission was not made public at the time and it was not until 1967, when the Commission's report was presented to Parliament, that the public was informed that the Gordon Scheme involved the flooding of Lake Pedder. Yet it is clear from what I have said that the Commission was aware of the possibility, or indeed, probability, of it from about 1962 or 1963.

It suffices, in the circumstances, having come thus far in this brief history, (to the point where an internal decision was made, to flood Lake Pedder and the National Park), to supply merely a few notes on the chain of events that followed, which we shall obviously need to explore in detail in our Report, which will issue later. The most important events from 1962 onwards could perhaps be summarised as follows:

1962 South-West Committee established, comprising representatives of leading community organisations and interests.

1963 Tasmania Government submission to Australian Government, seeking funds for construction of the Gordon road. Gordon road begun.

1964 Announcement of Interdepartmental Committee to consider the South-West.

1965 The Premier : "There would be some modification of Lake Pedder National Park':

1966 April: Declaration of South-West Faunal District, 16.8 million acres.

June: Application to Australian Government for financial assistance for Gordon Scheme (not publicly announced until a year later).

August: South-West Committee's recommendations for the conservation and development of South-West Tasmania.

December: Terms of Reference laid down for Interdepartmental Committee.

1967 February: Visit to Lake Pedder by museum staffs arranged by HEC.

March: Save Lake Pedder National Park Committee formed.

7 April: Interdepartmental Committee Report on the Development of the South-West of Tasmania.

1 May:HEC Report on Middle Gordon Scheme.

25 May: HEC Report tabled in Parliament (Flooding of Pedder now "official"). "Storm of protest" follows.

31 May: Interdepartmental Committee Report tabled: to the like effect and recommending the dedication of South-West National Park.

8 June: South-West Committee calls for appointment of a Select Committee of Legislative Council to consider the matter.

14 June: Select Committee appointed.

22 June: Tasmanian Government introduces Bill to gain authority for HEC proposals into Lower House passed 29 June.

28 June: Supplementary legislation introduced -passed 6 July.

29 June: Tasmania obtains special bridging finance, $47m, from Loan Council for HEC proposals. 22 August: Select Committee Report: "Deep regret that no satisfactory alternative for flooding Lake Pedder could be found."

24 August: Two above mentioned Bills passed by Legislative Council, the latter with amendment.

14 September: Amendment accepted by House of Assembly. 1967/ 1968 HEC decides to build Serpentine and Scott's Peak Dams (the latter to dam the Huon), first, (that is, before the Gordon Dam).

1968 October: New South-West National Park of 473.500 acres gazetted, (including the area of former Lake Pedder National Park). 1969 Reece Government defeated at the polls.

1971 Lake Pedder Action Committee (LPAC) formed. Serpentine dam completed; dam closed December.

1972 February: Rising waters several miles from Lake Pedder.

March: Resignation of Mr. K. Lyons forces an election. United Tasmania Group forms as a political party to contest Pedder issue at the elections. Public debate between HEC and LPAC through paid advertisements preceding poll.

22 April: Bethune Government defeated; Mr Reece becomes Premier again. "Although the United Tasmania Group failed to gain any seats, one candidate failed to gain representation by 150 votes."

7 June: Scott's Peak dam closed.

13 July: Attempt to have new Select Committee appointed fails.

July: LPAC attempts to initiate litigation to expose alleged flaw in legislation.

1 August: Mr Everett, Attorney-General, resigns when Cabinet overrules his decision to issue fiat allowing litigation to proceed.

10 August: Validating legislation passed, to remove doubts as to legality of flooding.

August: Pedder now flooded.

1972 2 December: Labor Government elected in Federal sphere.

1973 23 February: Appointment of this Committee by the new Australian Government

The Lake Pedder Conservation Campaign and the Official Response.

The full history of the Lake Pedder conservation campaign and the official response belongs also in our final Report, for it is an important part of the history and circumstances surrounding the flooding of Lake Pedder, and the adequacy or otherwise of the campaign on the one hand, and the response to it, on the other, will be an important factor for consideration in our examination of the various matters included in our Terms of Reference.

Suffice it to say, at this stage, therefore, that due to lack of information from official sources, the campaign only really got under way about March, 1967, a few months before the legislation was introduced into Parliament, at a time when the HEC was already firmly committed to the scheme involving the immersion of Lake Pedder and the greater part of Lake Pedder National Park, upon which it appears to have certainly decided probably as early as 1962 or 1963.

It would also be true to say that the campaign was met with hostility, rather than sympathy. (Neither the Premier, nor the HEC would, we think, deny that this was so.) This was perhaps understandable, (a kind of automatic "defence mechanism"), but unfortunate, for as the reader of our joint Interim Report will have seen, the views put by the campaigners have been very largely accepted by this Committee and were in the writer's view fully justified, at least in principle, though one does not necessarily accept all the expressed criticisms of the HEC.

But this lack of sympathy and respect for their views was doubly unfortunate in that, even if the conservationists had been wrong, they were, for the most part, judging by our experience of them, people whose views should have been heard with respect, even if the Government and the HEC disagreed with them. Anticipating, for the nonce, what we must say in our final Report, these people were giving expression, in the public interest, to views and values never adequately considered prior to the sittings of the Select Committee of the Legislative Council, in 1967, at earliest, and certainly never adequately brought home to the public, even then. It is a great pity that these voices were not heard more clearly in t 967 and indeed, that they had never been given a chance to express themselves, on the basis of adequate information, before HEC plans had been crystallised in earlier years.

With this brief review of the events that led up to, and followed, the fateful decision in 1967, 1 now turn to the questions which concerned the Committee.

3. Lake Pedder Can Still Be Saved

One is not unmindful of the important political implications of this whole matter. It has agitated the Tasmanian body politic now, off and on, for some seven years. In 1972 it was an issue in the State elections of that year. It has intruded into the national political arena.

Yet this Committee is not directly concerned with politics. Having weighed the evidence, and reached a conclusion on this aspect of the enquiry, the writer is now anxiously concerned, in penning these reasons, with only one thing: the way in which Lake Pedder may yet be saved.

Nor are we to be concerned, under our Terms of Reference, with fault or blame. One appreciates fuIly the difficult choices which politicians alone must make. Many things must be weighed in the balance, including in this case not only the unique beauty and value of Lake Pedder, (of which Tasmanian politicians were perhaps not sufficiently aware at the time), but Tasmania's need, as they saw it, for industrialisation, and the cheap power to make it possible. If any one was at fault in deciding as they did, it is we also, the whole Australian community, who were and are at fault -in not knowing, and not caring enough, about this and so much else in this beautiful country which we have taken so cheaply, and often ravaged so terribly. The men we elect to Parliament reflect the standards of the community, and if community standards change, theirs also will change.

Times have changed, somewhat.

And if in these changed times the Tasmanian Government is given another chance to save the Lake, without having to meet the cost (which they say, rightly enough, the whole Australian community should bear), who are we to speculate too nicely what that Government might or might not do?

Our task is to express our view, and the reasons for it. That done, the responsibility will pass to others.

The Choices Open

It had seemed when the Committee first began its work that there were but the two alternatives for Government: to allow the new impoundment to continue to fill, with the consequent loss of Lake Pedder for ever; or to apply the magic touch which would, so we are told, (by draining the present artificial lake), bring to life again the sleeping beauty of Lake Pedder, which now lies some thirty feet below the present face of the water. (As to the expected process of regeneration, if this were to occur, see later.)

But a third possibility was put to the Committee by Mr Geoff Parr, Senior Lecturer in Art at the Tasmanian College of Advanced Education, who has played a leading part in the work of the Lake Pedder Action Committee, (hereinafter referred to as "the LPAC"),a body formed in 1971 to save the Lake. What Mr Parr suggested was a five-year "moratorium" period, which he formulated for us in writing as follows:-

A climate of goodwill and an ability for fresh thinking are probably the most important pre-requisites to an effective solution to the Lake Pedder issue.

In purely mechanical terms there seems to be a possibility which allows opportunity for the opposing interests. This is made possible by the 27% over supply of electric power in Tasmania. In rough terms the suggestion is for

1. A five year moratorium on flooding in he Serpentine above the normal summer level of Lake Pedder.

2. The underwriting by the Commonwealth Government of any losses arising from such a moratorium. Such expenses could amount to the running costs of the two thermal stations if power demand accelerated and he waiving of interest and repayment of capital during the five years as these relate to the works in the Serpentine Valley.

3. The setting up of review procedures for the eventual decision. (interim decisions may be necessary.)

The moratorium period would allow a better realisation of Tasmania's power demands and show whether or not Pedder could be restored.

It may be noted that a precedent exists for this kind of solution, in the action taken several years ago by the Government of New Zealand in deciding to postpone the proposed flooding of Lake Manapouri, until it was proved to be justified by an increasing demand for power. In the event, Lake Manapouri was saved.

The thermal stations to which Mr Parr refers are the Bell Bay stations, the first of which was completed by the Hydro-Electric Commission about 1968. These are the only thermal stations in Tasmania. It has not yet been found necessary to use the Bell Bay stations to any great extent.

The questions which arise in choosing between these three possibilities involved, amongst other things, a consideration of the following matters:-

(a) The feasibility, as an engineering proposition, of modifying the Scheme so as to permit Lake Pedder to reappear, (and hopefully the upper reaches of the Serpentine also), and the preferred means of doing so;

(b) the cost of such modification;

(c) a comparison between Pedder as it was, the new Serpentine-Huon impoundment as it would be if completed, and Lake Pedder as it would be if it were now to be restored

(d) the effect and significance of Lake Pedder and the surrounding area having been declared a National Park in 1955;

(e) an examination of the cost of implementing the moratorium proposal, involving an assessment of the present and the likely future demand for and supply of electric power in Tasmania,

(f) an attempt to evaluate whether the Australian Government would be justified in offering to bear the cost, first, of implementing the moratorium proposal and, later (if it were so decided), the cost of an alternate scheme to restore Lake Pedder permanently;

(g) the economic factors which led the Hydro-Electric Commission to recommend, and the Tasmanian Government and Parliament to decide in 1967 to proceed with the plan to flood Lake Pedder, and the likelihood that they would be of a different mind if those economic factors no longer militated against saving the Lake, (that is, because of a proffered Australian Government grant).

There is nothing to be gained by repeating here the detailed assessments which appear in our joint Interim Report of the matters listed above under the heads (a), (b) & (e), but consistently with the writer's endeavour to present these reasons as an integrated and readable whole I shall endeavour to summarise the result of those assessments in what appears below.

Possible Modifications of the Middle Gordon River Scheme

The scheme is the most economical of various proposals which have been considered. Costly changes are beyond the resources of the State and cannot be contemplated... it is beyond reason to expect that a Stare with the small population and limited resources of Tasmania should be called upon to shoulder the heavy financial burden involved in 'saving Lake Pedder', especially when it seems that much of the outcry originates from sources beyond our own boundaries. I have yet to hear any offer of financial assistance from those to whom the preservation of this lake is claimed to be of such importance. it must be appreciated that we are talking in terms of many millions of dollars at a rime when here in Tasmania we have sufficient anxiety in dealing with expenditure of a few hundred thousands or even a few score thousands of dollars.

Letter from the Hen. W. A. Bethune. Premier of Tasmania, to Sir Garfield Barwick, then President of the Australian Conservation Foundation, dated the 5th of October. 1971.

There always were, and still are, practicable means of modifying the Middle Gordon Scheme so as to spare Lake Pedder. If the HEC had been content with the waters of the Gordon alone, or the Gordon and the Serpentine alone, there would have been no need to flood the Lake. But the HEC wanted the waters of the Huon also, though the Huon waters contribute only 12% of the total average flow from the three rivers involved. And by raising the Serpentine-Huon impoundment to the level of McPartlan Pass canal, they would be able to pass the waters of the Serpentine and Huon catchments across to the Gordon storage by gravity flow. (See Figure 2, Interim Report).

From engineering and economic points of view alone it was a neat solution, and one which gave maximum water flow for the Gordon Power Station, at minimum cost. Of course it involved the flooding of Lake Pedder and an enormous area of country, including almost half the National Park, but this was something which the HEC appeared to be able to accept with surprising equanimity.

In its Report to the Premier. dated the 18th May. 1967, which preceded the enabling legislation, the HEC had tended to lump together the Serpentine and Huon waters as if they were an inseparable whole.

A consideration of the effect on Lake Pedder comes only towards the very end of the HEC Report. The innocent reader would get the impression from it that the whole development. including the drowning of Pedder, would be an unmitigated boon to bushwalkers, naturalists, holiday-makers and tourists, and the only loss a certain "landing strip for light aircraft" (Pedder beach!). It really does seem, as one reads, that the engineers of the HEC were genuinely unaware of the enormity of what they proposed to do. Certainly there is no explicit recognition, anywhere in their Report, that the development was to involve the flooding of the greater part of a National Park. much less the destruction of one of the most beautiful environments in Australia.

At about the same time as the HEC Report was presented, a further Report, on the Development of the South-West, was presented by an Interdepartmental Committee which had been appointed in the previous year (1966). This IDC Report made no attempt to review the HEC scheme to flood the National Park; it simply referred to it as if it were a fait accompli, and showed the same insouciance about the results:

"This new Lake would inundate Lake Pedder to a depth of some 40 feet and this would result in he loss of the beach as a light aircraft landing strip in the summer seasons."

That is all.

Comment is superfluous.

Significantly, the HEC Report had said nothing whatever about the possibility of any modifications which could have saved Lake Pedder, nor did it open up any possibility of choice, or half-way house, between its scheme and no scheme at all. It was not until the matter came before a Select Committee of the Legislative Council, (and then only at a late stage in its proceedings), that it emerged that there were alternatives which could have saved the Lake.

The Select Committee of the Legislative Council, which considered the matter in the months that followed, commented in its Report that

"If for example, after submitting its report to the Minister, the Commission had made public details of its investigations into an alternative scheme designed to avoid flooding Lake Pedder which for various reasons had to be rejected, a great deal of the present resentment may have been avoided.

"The Committee itself did not become aware that this alternative scheme had been considered by the Commission until late in its enquires and points out that earlier evidence of it would have greatly facilitated its work."

But even though the existence of alternatives emerged in the closing stages of the Select Committee hearings, it was really too late to enable any worthwhile public discussion of the matter. By the time the Select Committee presented its Report the enabling legislation had already been passed through the House of Assembly, and the Legislative Council was under pressure from the Government to pass it through the Council, which it in fact did, two days later.

Unlike the HEC and the Interdepartmental Committee, the Select Committee showed genuine concern about the inundation of Lake Pedder, but it appears never to have understood that Lake Pedder could be saved by forfeiting the Huon waters alone. Instead it appears to have unwittingly accepted the HEC's "packaging" of the Serpentine and Huon, and therefore considered the question as if it were a matter of choosing between the loss of Lake Pedder on the one hand, or on the other, losing the waters of the Serpentine and the Huon, (the latter being only 12% of the total waters involved, whilst the two together constituted 40% of the total).

The Select Committee went on to consider ways in which the Serpentine and Huon waters might be transferred to the Gordon storage without flooding Lake Pedder, but reluctantly rejected these proposals, stating that it was "not convinced that the pumping proposal would preserve Lake Pedder and the Serpentine Valley in a form resembling its natural state. It believes that the partial preservation that would result could not justify the considerable adverse effect on the economics and operation of the Middle Gordon Power Development".

If the members of the Select Committee had addressed their minds to the abandonment of the Huon alone, as a means of saving Pedder, they may have given a different answer; who knows? Later in their Report they were to consider, for a different purpose, what cost would be involved in the forfeiture of Huon waters alone : $6,200,000. Perhaps they would have thought even that sum too high a price for Tasmania to pay in order to Save Pedder.

The Preferred Alternative

Various possible alternatives to the flooding of Pedder are sufficiently described in our joint Interim Report. Two of these are the schemes involving the use of Huon waters, considered and rejected by the Select Committee. The third, which is the one which conservationists, (and I should think our Committee), now favour, is the proposal "to drop the level of the Serpentine impoundment below the outlet of Lake Pedder and abandon the Huon storage altogether, pumping from the reduced Serpentine impoundment into Lake Gordon". (See Figure 7 in the Interim Report).

This proposal is still quite feasible, and according to the best scientific views, if done reasonably soon it would result, ultimately, in the restoration of Lake Pedder and its environs, including the Upper Serpentine, to something, closely approaching their natural state : see later.

Predominance of the Economic Factor

It is very easy for people on the mainland to be concerned about the 'fate of Lake Pedder' when one and all no doubt expect Tasmanians to bear the substantial additional costs.

The Hon W.A. Bethune, in a letter to Sir Garfield Barwick of the 5th October, 1971.

The cost is unacceptable to my Government and, I am convinced, to the people of the State.

Mr. Bethune, in a letter to the Tasmanian Conservation Trust of the 20th December, 1977.

There can be no doubt, from what has been quoted above (from various sourced, ranging from the HEC to the Select Committee, and the Premier of Tasmania), that whatever other arguments were summoned up from time to time, it was the economic factors which dictated both the original decision to flood Lake Pedder, and the subsequent resistance to any modification of the

Scheme after it had been approved by the Tasmanian Parliament.

Two important conclusions follow:-

First, that the Tasmanian Government and Parliament will not agree to any change unless the Australian Government offers to bear the whole cost involved, ( and in such a way as not to prejudice Tasmania financially in any other way);

Secondly, that if the Australian Government were to make such an offer the Tasmanian Government and Parliament may be expected to accept it.

Quite understandably, pride might offer a slight obstacle, but one sees no real reason why it should prove insuperable. The Tasmanian Government could say, not without dignity, if such an offer were made: We could not afford it, but if you (the Australian Government and people) wish to do so, we are very glad to accept.

It is hard to see any good reason why the Tasmanian Government and people should wish to refuse such a generous offer, if it were made, or what valid reasons could be adduced for refusing to allow the Lake to be restored, in the national interest , on the Australian Government agreeing to bear the whole present and future cost involved. It is significant in this regard to note that when pressed for an answer on this point, by a letter from LPAC dated as recently as the 15th May, 1973, the Hon. E.E,. Reece, the present Premier, declined to say whether his Government would refuse an offer from the Australian Government of a "non-repayable special grant for modifying the Middle Gordon Scheme, to allow for saving Lake Pedder". Mr. Reece's reply, in his letter dated the 17th May last, was as follows:-

"The possibility of the Australian Government making an offer of a grant to vary the scheme to save Lake Pedder is in the realm of speculation at this stage and I will make my views public if or when any such offer is made.

I repeat, however, that there are many Tasmanian projects on which I would rather see the sum of $15 million spent, which my questioner on "This Day Tonight" mentioned."

Cost of the Preferred Alternative

After a full consideration of the figures provided by the HEC and the Tasmanian Government our joint Interim Report concludes that the cost of the preferred alternative described above would probably be of the order of a total figure of $22 million made up of an expenditure of $11,600,000 in capital works, capitalised pumping costs, and interest charges, and a further $10.8 million in loss of energy resulting from the abandonment of the Huon waters.

It is not for the writer to question these figures, relying as I do, to a large extent, in such matters, on my engineer colleagues on the Committee. but it is not entirely irrelevant to point out, perhaps, that the HEC apparently supplied figures to the Select Committee showing that the "capitalised economic loss..... if the waters of the Huon were not diverted was $6,200,000"16 despite its later claim of $11million, which has been accepted. in effect, in our Interim Report. And indeed the book Lake Pedder argues for a figure of less than $2.5 million, for reasons there given.

Suffice it to say. in the circumstances. that the figure of $11 million appears to be an absolute maximum; on closer examination it may turn out to be much less.

Cost of the Moratorium

The joint Interim Report also includes an estimate of the cost of a proposed moratorium period of three years, during which the waters in the Serpentine and Huon catchments would be lowered so as to restore Lake Pedder and the Upper Serpentine. thus allowing a period in which to assess the degree of recovery of the Lake and its environs, and, if seen fit, to plan the proposed modification.

After examining projected supply and demand for electric power in Tasmania over the period and other relevant factors, the joint Interim Report concludes that the adoption of the moratorium proposal would be unlikely to prejudice the ability of the HEC to meet expected power demands, and that the cost of such a moratorium would probably not exceed a total of $8 million, and could vary anywhere between no cost. (unlikely) and that figure.

This moratorium figure would be additional to the estimated cost of the modification to give effect to the preferred alternative.

Making every assumption in favour of the HEC and the Tasmanian Government. (who have always sought, naturally enough, to place the highest possible estimates on these costs), it would appear probable that the cost of restoring Lake Pedder would be of the order of $22 million at most, and if there is to be a moratorium period, the total cost of the modification and the moratorium should not exceed $30 million.

I shall use this estimate of $30 million as a maximum estimate in what follows.

Summing Up

Thus one has reached the position that:

(a) the present and the likely future demand for power in Tasmania is such that it is possible to save Lake Pedder, or at least to grant it a reprieve, say for a period of three to five years, as suggested by Mr. Parr. without any serious threat of a resultant power shortage.

(b) it is quite practicable, from an engineering point of view, to modify the scheme in such a way as to restore Lake Pedder.

(c) the total cost of such modification, and a moratorium period is not likely to exceed $30 million.

I pass now to the comparison between Pedder as it was. the new Serpentine-Huon impoundment as it wouId be if completed, and Lake Pedder as it would be if it were now to be restored, and my reasons for the final conclusion that the estimated costs, as set out above, are not such as to be prohibitive, when weighed in the balance against what is at stake in the loss or retention of the Lake Pedder complex.

NOTE In considering the question of costs, our joint Interim Report says at one point that, "In the long term any shortfall of output from the Gordon will be made good from new hydro schemes rather than thermal schemes, until he economic hydro potential is all developed." Lest this be thought to imply any kind of blanket approval of hydro schemes, regardless of environmental consequences, I should perhaps say, (and one feels sure my fellow members would agree),that no such blanket approval is intended: this very case shows that one does not approve development at any cost; each case must turn on its own merits, and a weighing up of pros and cons, including of course the environmental consequences, which sometimes involve too high a price even for the most economical of schemes.